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jueves, diciembre 29, 2011

Ayer Cortes de energía eléctrica afectaron a varias zonas de las regiones del Maule y Bio Bio

Cortes de energía eléctrica afectaron a varias zonas de las regiones del Maule y Biobío

La suspensión del suministro se relacionaría con problemas registrados en el SIC, según la firma distribuidora de electricidad.

SANTIAGO.- Varios cortes de energía eléctrica se registraron durante la tarde y la noche del martes en varias zonas de las regiones del Maule y del Biobío.

Las suspensiones del suministro ocurrieron en Parral, Retiro, Cauquenes, Chanco, Longaví y Pelluhue, en la Séptima Región, y San Carlos, San Nicolás, Quirihue, Cobquecura, Trehuaco, Niquén y San Fabián, en la Octava.

De acuerdo a informaciones entregadas por la Compañía General de Electricidad (CGE) Distribución, los cortes se relacionan con problemas localizados en el Sistema Interconectado Central (SIC), los que no tendrían relación con los tendidos de distribución de su responsabilidad, según radio Cooperativa.

Un hecho similar ocurrió el 14 de diciembre pasado en la Región del Maule. En esa oportunidad, el corte se debió a las altas temperaturas en la zona central, las que influyen en la posibilidad de sobrecarga en las redes de transmisión.









































Fuente:

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
 CEL: 93934521
Santiago- Chile
Soliciten nuestros cursos de capacitación  y consultoría en GERENCIA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA -LIDERAZGO -  GESTION DEL CONOCIMIENTO - RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL – LOBBY – COACHING EMPRESARIAL-ENERGIAS RENOVABLES   ,  asesorías a nivel nacional e  internacional y están disponibles  para OTEC Y OTIC en Chile

miércoles, diciembre 28, 2011

Why the Left Is Losing the Argument over the Financial Crisis

Fair-minded people are persuaded by facts, not invective.

The day before Christmas, Joe Nocera did it again—wasted a perfectly good column with another attack on us, Peter Wallison and Ed Pinto.

It's worth reading for what it says about the Left's current situation. According to Nocera, we "almost single-handedly" have created a "myth that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac caused the financial crisis." Those who have fallen for this myth, according to Nocera, include congressional Republicans and the Wall Street Journal's editorial page.

It's somewhat implausible that two guys at a Washington think-tank, arguing that the financial crisis was caused by government housing policy, could create a widely accepted alternative to the conventional liberal narrative that the financial crisis was caused by the greed and lack of regulation of Wall Street. After all, the conventional narrative was created by the government, propagated by the New York Times, and accepted without question by just about every other major newspaper and electronic mass media outlet, foreign and domestic. Apparently, however, in Noceraworld, threats to the accepted narrative can never be fully suppressed.

It's somewhat implausible that two guys at a Washington think-tank could create a widely accepted alternative to the conventional liberal narrative that the financial crisis was caused by the greed and lack of regulation of Wall Street.

We doubt that we have been as successful as Nocera fears, but we believe that Nocera and his ilk are losing the argument about what caused the financial crisis. If in fact our views have received sufficient credence to warrant the alarm of the New York Times, a reading of his attack piece will tell you why. The article is fully representative of the Left's approach—don't bother with facts, just call your opposition liars or worse (racists) and leave it at that. This name-calling is then dutifully repeated throughout the leftwing echo-chamber.

To the extent that we have had any success in challenging the conventional narrative about the causes of the crisis, it is because fair-minded people are persuaded by facts, not invective. Our argument is and has been that the financial crisis would not have occurred but for government housing policy implemented principally through Fannie and Freddie and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Although there were a number of such policies, the most important were the affordable housing requirements first imposed on Fannie and Freddie in 1992 and expanded and tightened by HUD through 2007.

Summarized below are the original numbers we relied on, taken from Fannie and Freddie's own data and from the views of bank regulators—and now supplemented with additional data from the Securities and Exchange Commission's recent complaints against certain officers of Fannie and Freddie. Of particular interest are Fannie and Freddie's non-prosecution agreements with the SEC, in which they agree with facts that confirm—and in many cases go beyond—our original research concerning the scope of the GSEs' subprime and Alt-A exposure. These are facts, and Nocera and others who might wish it otherwise should become familiar with them.

For example, in its non-prosecution agreement Freddie agreed that as of June 30, 2008, it had $244 billion in subprime loans, comprising 14 percent of its credit guaranty portfolio, rather than the $6 billion it had previously disclosed. Freddie also agreed that it had $541 billion in reduced documentation loans alone, vastly more than the $190 billion in previously disclosed Alt-A loans which Freddie had said included loans with reduced documentation.   

While the SEC documents about $1.03 trillion in previously undisclosed subprime and Alt-A loans in Fannie and Freddie's credit guaranty portfolios, an estimated $812.8 billion, or about 80 percent, were already accounted for in the totals of Fannie and Freddie subprime and Alt-A exposures included in Pinto's Forensic Study and Wallison's Dissent from the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.

The SEC findings add $219 billion and 1.43 million loans to our original Fannie and Freddie subprime and Alt-A totals, bringing the combined subprime and Alt-A total to $2.041 trillion and 13.37 million loans.

The SEC findings add $219 billion and 1.43 million loans to our original Fannie and Freddie subprime and Alt-A totals, bringing the combined subprime and Alt-A total to $2.041 trillion and 13.37 million loans.

All told, after adding the SEC's new data to our original estimates, there were approximately 28 million subprime and Alt-A loans outstanding on June 30, 2008, before the financial crisis, with a value of approximately $4.8 trillion. This was half of all mortgages in the United States. Of these loans, over 74 percent were on the books of U.S. government agencies and firms subject to government housing finance policies. This shows where the demand for these low quality loans came from. Fannie and Freddie were themselves exposed to more than 13 million subprime or Alt-A loans, or 65 percent of the government total.

The table below shows the values of the subprime and Alt-A loans originally included in Pinto's Forensic Study and Wallison's Dissent, supplemented by the data included in the SEC's complaints and the non-prosecution agreements.

Fannie and Freddie subprime and Alt-A totals as of June 30, 2008

(All numbers de-duped to eliminate inclusion in more than one category.)

Table in billions of dollars

Wallison Pinto Table 1

Peter J. Wallison is the Arthur F. Burns Fellow in Financial Policy Studies and Edward Pinto is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

FURTHER READING: Wallison also writes "Where No Mortgage News Is Fit to Print," "A Guaranteed Disaster," and "The Financial Crisis on Trial." Pinto contributes "Cleaning House: The Financial Crisis and the GSEs," "Senate Undermines Obama—and the Country—on Housing," and "New Bubble May be Building in 30-Year Mortgages."

Footnotes

1 In 2001, federal regulators determined that a FICO score of less than 660 can be used to identify a subprime mortgage. http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/SRletters/2001/sr0104a1.pdf

2 The GSEs published credit supplements at the time of their SEC filings. These supplements set forth loan characteristics with high risk. These included negative amortization, interest pnly, original LTV>90% (effectively >=95%), and Alt-A as disclosed by Fannie and Freddie.

3 In the case of both original LTV>90% and combined LTV>90%, the effective LTV is >=95%. In the case of original LTV>90%, this is confirmed by the fact that the LTV average for such loans was 97.4%. In the case of combined LTV, the 80/20 and 80/15 combinations would have resulted in a combined LTV>=95%.

4 These differ slightly from the Forensic Study/Dissent subtotals due to rounding and the need to change the de-duping hierarchy to incorporate the SEC additions.

5 $101.7 billion prior to de-duping.

6 $238 billion prior to de-duping.

7 $341 billion prior to de-duping.

8 $351 billion prior to de-duping.

Image by Bergman Group

Why the Left Is Losing the Argument over the Financial Crisis

27/12/2011 11:40

Fair-minded people are persuaded by facts, not invective.

The day before Christmas, Joe Nocera did it again—wasted a perfectly good column with another attack on us, Peter Wallison and Ed Pinto.

It's worth reading for what it says about the Left's current situation. According to Nocera, we "almost single-handedly" have created a "myth that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac caused the financial crisis." Those who have fallen for this myth, according to Nocera, include congressional Republicans and the Wall Street Journal's editorial page.

It's somewhat implausible that two guys at a Washington think-tank, arguing that the financial crisis was caused by government housing policy, could create a widely accepted alternative to the conventional liberal narrative that the financial crisis was caused by the greed and lack of regulation of Wall Street. After all, the conventional narrative was created by the government, propagated by the New York Times, and accepted without question by just about every other major newspaper and electronic mass media outlet, foreign and domestic. Apparently, however, in Noceraworld, threats to the accepted narrative can never be fully suppressed.

It's somewhat implausible that two guys at a Washington think-tank could create a widely accepted alternative to the conventional liberal narrative that the financial crisis was caused by the greed and lack of regulation of Wall Street.

We doubt that we have been as successful as Nocera fears, but we believe that Nocera and his ilk are losing the argument about what caused the financial crisis. If in fact our views have received sufficient credence to warrant the alarm of the New York Times, a reading of his attack piece will tell you why. The article is fully representative of the Left's approach—don't bother with facts, just call your opposition liars or worse (racists) and leave it at that. This name-calling is then dutifully repeated throughout the leftwing echo-chamber.

To the extent that we have had any success in challenging the conventional narrative about the causes of the crisis, it is because fair-minded people are persuaded by facts, not invective. Our argument is and has been that the financial crisis would not have occurred but for government housing policy implemented principally through Fannie and Freddie and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Although there were a number of such policies, the most important were the affordable housing requirements first imposed on Fannie and Freddie in 1992 and expanded and tightened by HUD through 2007.

Summarized below are the original numbers we relied on, taken from Fannie and Freddie's own data and from the views of bank regulators—and now supplemented with additional data from the Securities and Exchange Commission's recent complaints against certain officers of Fannie and Freddie. Of particular interest are Fannie and Freddie's non-prosecution agreements with the SEC, in which they agree with facts that confirm—and in many cases go beyond—our original research concerning the scope of the GSEs' subprime and Alt-A exposure. These are facts, and Nocera and others who might wish it otherwise should become familiar with them.

For example, in its non-prosecution agreement Freddie agreed that as of June 30, 2008, it had $244 billion in subprime loans, comprising 14 percent of its credit guaranty portfolio, rather than the $6 billion it had previously disclosed. Freddie also agreed that it had $541 billion in reduced documentation loans alone, vastly more than the $190 billion in previously disclosed Alt-A loans which Freddie had said included loans with reduced documentation.   

While the SEC documents about $1.03 trillion in previously undisclosed subprime and Alt-A loans in Fannie and Freddie's credit guaranty portfolios, an estimated $812.8 billion, or about 80 percent, were already accounted for in the totals of Fannie and Freddie subprime and Alt-A exposures included in Pinto's Forensic Study and Wallison's Dissent from the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.

The SEC findings add $219 billion and 1.43 million loans to our original Fannie and Freddie subprime and Alt-A totals, bringing the combined subprime and Alt-A total to $2.041 trillion and 13.37 million loans.

The SEC findings add $219 billion and 1.43 million loans to our original Fannie and Freddie subprime and Alt-A totals, bringing the combined subprime and Alt-A total to $2.041 trillion and 13.37 million loans.

All told, after adding the SEC's new data to our original estimates, there were approximately 28 million subprime and Alt-A loans outstanding on June 30, 2008, before the financial crisis, with a value of approximately $4.8 trillion. This was half of all mortgages in the United States. Of these loans, over 74 percent were on the books of U.S. government agencies and firms subject to government housing finance policies. This shows where the demand for these low quality loans came from. Fannie and Freddie were themselves exposed to more than 13 million subprime or Alt-A loans, or 65 percent of the government total.

The table below shows the values of the subprime and Alt-A loans originally included in Pinto's Forensic Study and Wallison's Dissent, supplemented by the data included in the SEC's complaints and the non-prosecution agreements.

Fannie and Freddie subprime and Alt-A totals as of June 30, 2008

(All numbers de-duped to eliminate inclusion in more than one category.)

Table in billions of dollars

Wallison Pinto Table 1

Peter J. Wallison is the Arthur F. Burns Fellow in Financial Policy Studies and Edward Pinto is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

FURTHER READING: Wallison also writes "Where No Mortgage News Is Fit to Print," "A Guaranteed Disaster," and "The Financial Crisis on Trial." Pinto contributes "Cleaning House: The Financial Crisis and the GSEs," "Senate Undermines Obama—and the Country—on Housing," and "New Bubble May be Building in 30-Year Mortgages."

Footnotes

1 In 2001, federal regulators determined that a FICO score of less than 660 can be used to identify a subprime mortgage. http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/SRletters/2001/sr0104a1.pdf

2 The GSEs published credit supplements at the time of their SEC filings. These supplements set forth loan characteristics with high risk. These included negative amortization, interest pnly, original LTV>90% (effectively >=95%), and Alt-A as disclosed by Fannie and Freddie.

3 In the case of both original LTV>90% and combined LTV>90%, the effective LTV is >=95%. In the case of original LTV>90%, this is confirmed by the fact that the LTV average for such loans was 97.4%. In the case of combined LTV, the 80/20 and 80/15 combinations would have resulted in a combined LTV>=95%.

4 These differ slightly from the Forensic Study/Dissent subtotals due to rounding and the need to change the de-duping hierarchy to incorporate the SEC additions.

5 $101.7 billion prior to de-duping.

6 $238 billion prior to de-duping.

7 $341 billion prior to de-duping.

8 $351 billion prior to de-duping.

Image by Bergman Group

Fair-minded people are persuaded by facts, not invective.

The day before Christmas, Joe Nocera did it again—wasted a perfectly good column with another attack on us, Peter Wallison and Ed Pinto.

It's worth reading for what it says about the Left's current situation. According to Nocera, we "almost single-handedly" have created a "myth that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac caused the financial crisis." Those who have fallen for this myth, according to Nocera, include congressional Republicans and the Wall Street Journal's editorial page.

It's somewhat implausible that two guys at a Washington think-tank, arguing that the financial crisis was caused by government housing policy, could create a widely accepted alternative to the conventional liberal narrative that the financial crisis was caused by the greed and lack of regulation of Wall Street. After all, the conventional narrative was created by the government, propagated by the New York Times, and accepted without question by just about every other major newspaper and electronic mass media outlet, foreign and domestic. Apparently, however, in Noceraworld, threats to the accepted narrative can never be fully suppressed.

It's somewhat implausible that two guys at a Washington think-tank could create a widely accepted alternative to the conventional liberal narrative that the financial crisis was caused by the greed and lack of regulation of Wall Street.

We doubt that we have been as successful as Nocera fears, but we believe that Nocera and his ilk are losing the argument about what caused the financial crisis. If in fact our views have received sufficient credence to warrant the alarm of the New York Times, a reading of his attack piece will tell you why. The article is fully representative of the Left's approach—don't bother with facts, just call your opposition liars or worse (racists) and leave it at that. This name-calling is then dutifully repeated throughout the leftwing echo-chamber.

To the extent that we have had any success in challenging the conventional narrative about the causes of the crisis, it is because fair-minded people are persuaded by facts, not invective. Our argument is and has been that the financial crisis would not have occurred but for government housing policy implemented principally through Fannie and Freddie and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Although there were a number of such policies, the most important were the affordable housing requirements first imposed on Fannie and Freddie in 1992 and expanded and tightened by HUD through 2007.

Summarized below are the original numbers we relied on, taken from Fannie and Freddie's own data and from the views of bank regulators—and now supplemented with additional data from the Securities and Exchange Commission's recent complaints against certain officers of Fannie and Freddie. Of particular interest are Fannie and Freddie's non-prosecution agreements with the SEC, in which they agree with facts that confirm—and in many cases go beyond—our original research concerning the scope of the GSEs' subprime and Alt-A exposure. These are facts, and Nocera and others who might wish it otherwise should become familiar with them.

For example, in its non-prosecution agreement Freddie agreed that as of June 30, 2008, it had $244 billion in subprime loans, comprising 14 percent of its credit guaranty portfolio, rather than the $6 billion it had previously disclosed. Freddie also agreed that it had $541 billion in reduced documentation loans alone, vastly more than the $190 billion in previously disclosed Alt-A loans which Freddie had said included loans with reduced documentation.   

While the SEC documents about $1.03 trillion in previously undisclosed subprime and Alt-A loans in Fannie and Freddie's credit guaranty portfolios, an estimated $812.8 billion, or about 80 percent, were already accounted for in the totals of Fannie and Freddie subprime and Alt-A exposures included in Pinto's Forensic Study and Wallison's Dissent from the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.

The SEC findings add $219 billion and 1.43 million loans to our original Fannie and Freddie subprime and Alt-A totals, bringing the combined subprime and Alt-A total to $2.041 trillion and 13.37 million loans.

The SEC findings add $219 billion and 1.43 million loans to our original Fannie and Freddie subprime and Alt-A totals, bringing the combined subprime and Alt-A total to $2.041 trillion and 13.37 million loans.

All told, after adding the SEC's new data to our original estimates, there were approximately 28 million subprime and Alt-A loans outstanding on June 30, 2008, before the financial crisis, with a value of approximately $4.8 trillion. This was half of all mortgages in the United States. Of these loans, over 74 percent were on the books of U.S. government agencies and firms subject to government housing finance policies. This shows where the demand for these low quality loans came from. Fannie and Freddie were themselves exposed to more than 13 million subprime or Alt-A loans, or 65 percent of the government total.

The table below shows the values of the subprime and Alt-A loans originally included in Pinto's Forensic Study and Wallison's Dissent, supplemented by the data included in the SEC's complaints and the non-prosecution agreements.

Fannie and Freddie subprime and Alt-A totals as of June 30, 2008

(All numbers de-duped to eliminate inclusion in more than one category.)

Table in billions of dollars

Wallison Pinto Table 1

Peter J. Wallison is the Arthur F. Burns Fellow in Financial Policy Studies and Edward Pinto is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.


Fuente:

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
 CEL: 93934521
Santiago- Chile
Soliciten nuestros cursos de capacitación  y consultoría en GERENCIA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA -LIDERAZGO -  GESTION DEL CONOCIMIENTO - RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL – LOBBY – COACHING EMPRESARIAL-ENERGIAS RENOVABLES   ,  asesorías a nivel nacional e  internacional y están disponibles  para OTEC Y OTIC en Chile

SANTA MARIA IColbún Cobra Más de US$94 Millones de Garantía por Construcción de Central

SANTA MARIA I
Colbún Cobra Más de US$94 Millones de Garantía por Construcción de Central


La compañía de los Matte informó, además, que recurrirán a la Cámara Internacional de Comercio con sede en París, para la constitución de un tribunal arbitral.

La generadora Colbún, ligada al Grupo Matte, informó el cobro de US$94,1 millones, correspondientes al pago de unas boletas de garantías al consorcio con el que había suscrito un contrato para la construcción en Coronel de la central de carbón Santa María I.
Dicho acuerdo había sido firmado en junio de 2007 entre Colbún y un consorcio compuesto por Tecnimont, Slovenské Energetiché Strojárne, Tecnimont Do Brasil Construcao e Administracao de Projetos, Ingeniería y Construcción Tecnomont Chile y Compañía e Ingeniería y Construcción SES Chile.
"Los pagos referidos fueron requeridos por Colbún, por haber incurrido el Consorcio en incumplimientos a diversas obligaciones bajo el contrato, que generan multas y obligaciones restitutorias e indemnizaciones a favor de Colbún", señaló el gerente general de la empresa, Bernardo Larraín Matte, a través de un hecho esencial enviado a la Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS).
En el mismo documento, Colbún añadió que dada la situación, solicitó a la Cámara Internacional de Comercio con sede en París, la constitución del tribunal arbitral previsto en el contrato, medida que también habría sido pedida por el Consorcio. "Una vez iniciado el arbitraje, se estima que la presentación de demandas y contrademandas ocurrirá en un plazo de cuatro a seis meses", agregó.
Santa María I es una central a carbón que tendría una capacidad de 343 Mw y, según estima Colbún, estará en operación normal durante el primer trimestre del 2012.


Fuente:

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
 CEL: 93934521
Santiago- Chile
Soliciten nuestros cursos de capacitación  y consultoría en GERENCIA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA -LIDERAZGO -  GESTION DEL CONOCIMIENTO - RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL – LOBBY – COACHING EMPRESARIAL-ENERGIAS RENOVABLES   ,  asesorías a nivel nacional e  internacional y están disponibles  para OTEC Y OTIC en Chile

Empresa Portuaria San Antonio se reune con Ronald Bown Asoex

Ronald Bown se reunió con el directorio de la Empresa Portuaria San Antonio

Ayer | El presidente de la Asociación de Exportadores de Chile A.G. conoció los proyectos que tiene la portuaria estatal para seguir expandiendo el terminal local. Rodrigo Ogalde

El encuentro se llevó a cabo en las oficinas de Epsa. (@puertosantonio)

Este martes se llevó a cabo una reunión en la que participaron los miembros del directorio de la Empresa Portuaria de San Antonio (Epsa) y el presidente de la Asociación de Exportadores de Chile A.G. (Asoex), Ronald Bown.

La cita se concretó en las dependencias de Epsa, donde el directorio, presidido por Francisco Silva Donoso, le exhibió a Bown el plan maestro que tiene el puerto local para su expansión.

Fuentes de la portuaria estatal señalaron que el timonel de los exportadores se mostró muy conforme con el crecimiento obtenido en las últimas décadas por el puerto y con las inversiones que se harán en el terminal local, por lo que invitó a Epsa a repetir esta presentación en la reunión anual de Asoex, que se hará en enero próximo.

Al encuentro se sumaron el gerente general de Epsa, Alvaro Espinosa, y el resto de los miembros del directorio, entre ellos Harald Beyer, Ramón González y José Pedro Undurruga.

»Ver más de #puertosanantonio

Etiquetas: Empresa Portuaria San Antonio, San Antonio

Fuente:

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
 CEL: 93934521
Santiago- Chile
Soliciten nuestros cursos de capacitación  y consultoría en GERENCIA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA -LIDERAZGO -  GESTION DEL CONOCIMIENTO - RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL – LOBBY – COACHING EMPRESARIAL-ENERGIAS RENOVABLES   ,  asesorías a nivel nacional e  internacional y están disponibles  para OTEC Y OTIC en Chile

Presidente Sebastian Piñera llamó a la Presidenta de Argentina para conocer los detalles de su enfermedad

Piñera llamó a la Presidenta de Argentina para conocer los detalles de su enfermedad

El Mandatario se comunicó con Cristina Fernández, luego que la Casa Rosada informara que padece un cáncer de tiroides. Su homóloga le habría asegurado que una vez que se recupere, visitará Chile.

Piñera llamó a la Presidenta de Argentina para conocer los detalles de su enfermedad


Fuente:

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
 CEL: 93934521
Santiago- Chile
Soliciten nuestros cursos de capacitación  y consultoría en GERENCIA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA -LIDERAZGO -  GESTION DEL CONOCIMIENTO - RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL – LOBBY – COACHING EMPRESARIAL-ENERGIAS RENOVABLES   ,  asesorías a nivel nacional e  internacional y están disponibles  para OTEC Y OTIC en Chile

UDI defiende el binominal y dice que "Lagos no puede culparnos de las incapacidades de su gobierno"

UDI defiende el binominal y dice que "Lagos no puede culparnos de las incapacidades de su gobierno"

El vocero del gremialismo reaccionó ante los dichos del ex Mandatario, tras la cita con Sebastián Piñera, y afirmó que "parece que Lagos olvidó que fue la UDI la que salvó a su gobierno del colapso por corrupción".

por La Tercera - 28/12/2011 - 11:02
© AgenciaUNO

Luego de realizar ayer el ex Presidente Ricardo Lagos una crítica a la UDI, responsabilizándola de haber obstaculizado avances en reformas políticas, el vocero de la tienda gremialista, Víctor Pérez, aseveró que "el ex Presidente Lagos parece que olvidó que fue la UDI encabezada por Pablo Longueira la que salvó a su gobierno del colapso, cuando la corrupción en su administración tocó fondo". 

El parlamentario adujo que "Lagos no puede culparnos a nosotros de las incapacidades de su gobierno por cumplir sus promesas, y le quiero recordar que en la primera parte del gobierno de Bachelet, la Concertación tuvo la mayoría para hacer los cambios, pero no tuvo la voluntad política". 

A juicio del legislador, "el ex presidente equivoca el camino y es lamentable su soberbia que le impide reconocer los errores que cometió en su gobierno y tampoco es capaz de reconocer con humildad cuando se le tendió la mano".

Según explicó, la actitud del ex jefe de gobierno "porque no es posible sentarse a conversar con una persona cuyo objetivo es imponer una postura, y en ese escenario es imposible avanzar, por lo menos con él y su sector".

Respecto del cuestionamiento al sistema binominal, Pérez  argumentó que "nadie puede desconocer que el sistema electoral vigente ha sido un pilar fundamental para la estabilidad institucional del país, y esto ha sido reconocido incluso por parlamentarios de la Concertación".

En ese sentido, puntualizó que "ese es un elemento que se debe preservar y nosotros dese la UDI vamos a defender ese principio, porque la estabilidad política es imprescindible para seguir creciendo económicamente y avanzando hacia el desarrollo".

"Es lamentable que ex mandatarios pierdan la visión de Estado y se atrincheren en posturas ideológicas que no permiten avanzar hacia acuerdos que vayan en beneficio de todo el país", concluyó.


Fuente:

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
Diplomado en Coaching Ejecutivo ONU( 
  • PUEDES LEERNOS EN FACEBOOK
 
 
 
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AGRICULTURABLOGGER: La industria semillera en los nuevos escenarios

La industria semillera en los nuevos escenarios
 
28/12/2011





La industria semillera internacional ha mantenido su proceso de expansión, pero no al mismo ritmo de los años anteriores, porque, al igual que los commodities, debió acomodarse a la situación económica mundial.

Alfonso Traub Ramos


Fuente:

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The "Mystery" of the Endowment Effect

FROM MISSES ORG.

The "Mystery" of the Endowment Effect

Mises Daily: Wednesday, December 28, 2011 by

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The development of modern neoclassical economics is the story of how a discipline lost its way. Before the mathematization of economics, economists tried to explain prices and macro patterns in the market place from individual human action. But modern "mathonomics" has evolved into a subfield of mathematics with no obvious ties to the real economy. Assuming "perfect" conditions and general equilibrium, the conclusions of economic analysis follow directly from the premises — as one would expect from solving mathematical equations — and are hence of little scientific interest. It follows that phenomena in the real economy that do not seem to fit the "perfect" models should be dismissed as imperfections; what remains to explain is the causes of action rather than its effect. The task of economics has therefore shifted from explaining the effect of human action to tracking the causes of it.

This radical shift suggests that we already know all there is to know about markets (at least to the limited extent predicted by mathematical models), while it provides a breeding ground for analysis of behavior instead of action. In other words, in order to track the ultimate causes of our mathematically precise economic models, economists shift focus toward psychology and the identifying building blocks of actors' perception of self. Economists have moved from being experts at explaining economic phenomena and the market process to being at best run-of-the-mill mathematicians and second-rate psychologists.

Considering this development, it is no wonder that economists are puzzled by phenomena like the "endowment effect." Indeed, I have myself experienced statements by established economist scholars about this psychological effect that is assumed to be a mystery. In layman terms, the endowment effect is

a hypothesis that people value a good or service more once their property right to it has been established. In other words, people place a higher value on objects they own than objects that they do not. In one experiment, people demanded a higher price for a coffee mug that had been given to them but put a lower price on one they did not yet own. (from Wikipedia)

From a mathematical-economic point view, the endowment effect demonstrates the inability of formal economics to explain what drives human action. Indeed, the endowment effect seems to shift an actor's indifference curves, and thus his subjective valuation of goods and services, depending not on qualities in the good itself or its price but on the contextual, circumstantial characteristics and psychological state of the instant and situation. The economic explanation to market valuation is therefore at odds with real valuation and the models need to be expanded to include psychological drivers of subjective valuation. And therefore economics must embrace behavioral studies and neuroscience.

From an Austrian point of view, however, there is no problem and never was one. The "endowment effect" is but an illusory problem that arises due to the confusion of means and ends in modern economics. The only reason economists today find bewilderment in such an "effect" is that they have adopted precise mathematics as the end of economic analyses rather than seeing it as one of its possible means. In fact, the endowment effect, while literally impossible in mathematical analysis and assumed away in indifference-curve analysis, is necessary in any type of exchange. Both Menger and Böhm-Bawerk were well aware of this, and neither they nor any later Austrians ever recanted — and for good reason.

Let us borrow an illustration from Böhm-Bawerk's Positive Theory of Capital (pp. 143–47), in which a farmer "has just harvested five sacks of corn." These sacks are to keep him alive until the next harvest and therefore he makes plans for how to use them. Böhm-Bawerk writes,

One sack he absolutely requires for the sustenance of his life till the next harvest. A second he requires to supplement this bare living to the extent of keeping himself hale and vigorous. More corn than this, in the shape of bread and farinaceous food generally, he has no desire for. On the other hand, it would be very desirable to have some animal food, and he sets aside, therefore, a third sack to feed poultry. A fourth sack he destines for the making of coarse spirits. Suppose, now, that his various personal wants have been fully provided for by this apportionment of the four sacks, and that he cannot think of anything better to do with the fifth sack than feed a number of parrots, whose antics amuse him. (p. 150)

The farmer therefore dedicates each sack to a certain use intended to give him the most possible satisfaction. The sacks are substitutes, which means that it does not matter to this farmer which particular sack is used to distill brandy or feed the parrots. Indeed, to this farmer the sacks can be used interchangeably, and the loss of one sack of grain (no matter which one) will always mean (assuming the farmer's preferences do not change) the parrots will have to find food on their own or find another benevolent farmer with grain in excess of his personal needs. At any loss of grain, the farmer will readily reorganize the stock at hand so that he maximizes his utility.

Imagine if this farmer somehow loses two of his sacks so that he has only three sacks left. Obviously, he will use the three sacks for food but will have no grain to distill brandy or feed parrots. And if he were to increase his stock by one sack, he would distill brandy — the parrots would always (under the aforementioned preferences) have to wait until the farmer has a total of at least five sacks on hand.

Let us assume this farmer has some money under his mattress and the opportunity to purchase a fourth sack of grain. The economic problem is what the price of that fourth sack would be. From the farmer's perspective, it is obvious that he could give up some value to get his hands on the extra grain. How much? He would only purchase the sack of grain if it makes him better off, that is to say that he will not give up a higher value for the sack of grain than the value he would receive in using it. In fact, since he intends to use this fourth sack of grain to distill brandy, he would be willing (and, we have assumed, able) to pay anything less than the value he attributes to that brandy. Were he to pay more than this value, then he would be worse off; were he to pay an equal value, then going through with the exchange means nothing to him — so why would he do it? The only way this farmer would go through with the exchange is if he gives up less value than he receives. And the same goes for the seller — he or she will sell a sack of grain to the farmer only if the value of it is perceived as lower than the value of the payment for it.

This means both the buyer and seller gain from trade, which is an age-old economic truth. But it also means that the price, in terms of the actors' subjective valuation, is necessarily (a) lower than the value of the good purchased for the buyer, and (b) higher than the value of the good sold for the seller.

Let us assume the farmer (we'll call him A) has already purchased the fourth sack of grain and that he paid eight silver coins for it. Another farmer (let's call him B) visits and wishes to purchase a sack of grain. What price would A require in order to sell the sack to B? Neoclassical economics assumes indifference and therefore that the price of this fourth sack of grains is eight silver coins. But this is not true — we have already shown that A was willing to pay eight silver coins for the sack of grains because he valued the sack of grains at more than eight silver coins. He would not have chosen to give up those coins if he did not place a lesser value on them than the grain. Farmer B would have to pay farmer A a price that exceeds the value A sees in using the grain to distill brandy, perhaps ten silver coins (and, for the sake of simplicity, we can say that he values the brandy at nine silver coins).

The endowment effect is the price difference between eight and ten silver coins. To neoclassical economists, it is supposedly a mystery that farmer A, when having only three sacks of grain, is willing to pay the price of eight silver coins for an additional sack of grain, but when he has acquired it, he is not willing to sell it for less than ten silver coins!

But there is no mystery to the endowment effect — and there is no effect. Indeed, farmer A does not value the fourth sack of grain differently depending on whether he wishes to acquire it or if he considers selling it — he values the sack of grain exactly the same. Throughout this example, the value of the fourth sack to the farmer is his use of it to distill brandy. The value is not the price he is willing to pay to acquire it, and it is not the price he is willing to accept to give it up. Exchange is not the result of an equality in valuation, as indifference-curve analysis assumes, but a result of inequality in the parties' valuation. The seller must value that which he gains through the exchange more than what he gives up, just as the buyer must value that which he gains more than that which he gives up. Only when this is the case is exchange possible and expected.

The bewilderment due to the endowment effect is only because neoclassical economics has sacrificed economic truth for the sake of the mathematical means in economic analysis. In a strictly mathematical analysis the conclusions follow directly from the assumptions. Those using such frameworks in economic analyses need to look somewhere outside the framework to find causes and explanations, because math is tautological and does not identify causes or provide explanations — only illustrations.

The obvious solution to this shortcoming in the framework is to replace it with something better and more realistic, not persist in seeking explanations elsewhere.

 

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
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Récords de exportación de industria armamentista alemana

 

Pese a la crisis, la venta de armas de guerra alemanas alcanzó cifras récords en 2010. Ello, aunque oficialmente se le concedieran menos licencias, confirma un informe aprobado este miércoles (7.12.2011) en Berlín.

 

La exportación de armas de guerra alemanas alcanzó cifras récord en 2010, confirma un informe aprobado y dado a conocer en Berlín por el gabinete de Gobierno de Ángela Merkel. A 2.100 millones de euros se elevaron las ganancias de la industria armamentista durante el 2010. En 2009 había sido casi la mitad: 1.300 millones.

Aproximadamente la mitad de estos ingresos se obtuvo con la exportación de buques de guerra a socios de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN), destaca la agencia de noticias alemana dpa. Adicionalmente, las empresas alemanas del ramo cerraron contratos, el pasado año, por valor de unos 5.000 millones de euros, publica el diario alemán de economía y finanzas Handelsblatt.

La nota de prensa oficial lo resume de otro modo: alrededor del 70 por ciento de estas exportaciones oficialmente aprobadas "se dirigió a países de la Unión Europea (UE), la OTAN y países equiparables". Con éstos últimos el informe se refiere a Australia, Japón, Nueva Zelanda, Suiza. El resto de las ventas aprobadas hallaron su destino, por ejemplo, en países de África y el Golfo Arábigo Pérsico.

Exportación a Arabia Saudí

Arabia Saudí ocupa el lugar diez entre los principales países de destino de las armas de alemanas, con un volumen de exportaciones que asciende a 152,5 millones de euros, destacan medios de prensa germanos.

Ello, pese a la polémica que estos negocios despiertan en la opinión pública alemana, que señala a la situación de los derechos humanos en ese país y al temor de que el armamento pueda emplearse para reprimir protestas internas. "Las decisiones sobre los planes de exportación de armamento se aprueban previa evaluación exhaustiva de argumentos de política exterior, seguridad y derechos humanos", asegura sin embargo la nota oficial.

Protesta contra la exportación de armamentos frente a la sede del Parlamento alemán (6.07.2011).Bildunterschrift: Protesta contra la exportación de armamentos frente a la sede del Parlamento alemán (6.07.2011).

El informe apuntala así las preocupaciones que la política oficial de exportación de armamento generó hace unos meses entre políticos de oposición, organizaciones de derechos humanos y medios de prensa en Alemania, al conocerse la venta de 200 tanques Leopard 2 a Arabia Saudí.

Pero no sólo aviones, buques y tanques de combate, sino también lanzagranadas y ametralladoras automáticas se cuentan entre los "productos militares" de todo tipo exportados por la industria armamentista alemana. Bajo el rótulo de "productos militares" se incluyen, además de armas de guerra, otros elementos de tecnología y software.

Menos permisos, ¿más control?

Como sea, el Ejecutivo germano insiste en el descenso de los permisos de exportación aprobados. "El Gobierno Federal se ajusta a las estrictas reglas de los controles de exportación de armamento", se lee en la nota de prensa. El volumen de licencias otorgadas para la exportación de "productos militares" se redujo en un 5,7 porciento, con ganancias por valor de 4.700  millones de de euros (290 millones menos que el año anterior).

Asimismo, las licencias de exportación hacia países en vías de desarrollo generaron ingresos por valor de 365 millones de euros, 43 millones menos que en 2009. Éstas, que se conceden de forma "restrictiva", representaron en 2010 casi el ocho por ciento del total de licencias concedidas.

Fusiles de asalto G-36, de la firma Heckler & Koch, aparecieron en Libia.Bildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift:  Fusiles de asalto G-36, de la firma Heckler & Koch, aparecieron en Libia.Sin embargo, menos licencias, como se ve, no sólo no reducen las ganancias, sino que tampoco aseguran el control. "Las licencias sólo fueron otorgadas luego de comprobado, en cada caso, que el armamento alemán no sería utilizado en violaciones de los derechos humanos, ni contribuiría al recrudecimiento de conflictos", se afirma en una nota aclaratoria del ministerio alemán de Economía.

No obstante, ello no pudo evitar que recientemente apareciesen en Libia fusiles de asalto G-36 de la firma Heckler & Koch, originalmente enviados a Egipto, señala el Handelsblatt. Y lo mismo vale para 36 armas cortas de distintos calibres de procedencia alemana, decomisadas este martes (6.12.2011) en México, antes de que fuesen exportadas ilegalmente a Costa Rica. Ello, a un mes de una redada de las autoridades alemanas en las instalaciones de Heckler & Koch, bajo sospecha de haber pagado sobornos para conseguir contratos de envío a México.

"Las armas cortas son las verdaderas armas de exterminio masivo de nuestro tiempo, y las alemanas están presentes en casi cualquier guerra de este mundo", aseguró el diputado de La Izquierda alemana, Jan van Aken. A tono con la postura de su partido, el parlamentario de oposición volvió a pedir una prohibición de la exportación de armamento, que podría comenzar por las armas cortas.

Autor: Rosa Muñoz Lima

Editor: José Ospina-Valencia


Fuente:

Saludos
Rodrigo González Fernández
Diplomado en "Responsabilidad Social Empresarial" de la ONU
Diplomado en "Gestión del Conocimiento" de la ONU
Diplomado en Gerencia en Administracion Publica ONU
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 CEL: 93934521
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